The Guidelines Challenge Conference on which this special issue builds asked as the first of its "further relevant questions": "How do we incorporate more types of causally relevant information in guidelines?" This paper first supports the presupposition of this question-that we need further kinds of evidence-by pointing out that the randomized controlled trial, touted as the best source of evidence on effectiveness, can do so little for us. Second, it outlines a number of other good ways to learn what will work that the medical community, and much of the public health community, is not making much use of. Knowledge of the full POE for an individual or a population of individuals would be incredibly useful in predicting outcomes for them. Yet the RCT provides only a small amount of information about the POE, and that only for the study population, which is seldom the population of interest. Given these limitations, it is surely a good idea also to use other methods that allow us to draw causal conclusions, and often about the population of interest. I will briefly describe a number of these in section 5.
T i is a dichotomous (1,0) treatment variable indicating whether i is treated and β i is the individual treatment effect of the treatment on i: it represents how much T contributes to the outcome Y for individual i, which depends on the factors that regulate this. The x are other linear causes of the outcome. The POE is causal through and through. It is supposed to capture a minimal set of causes of Y i sufficient to fix its value for i. Philosophers and epidemiologists will probably be familiar with the same ideas in a Boolean yes/no-variable version:
The POE assumes that causes are INUS conditions: insufficient but necessary parts of unnecessary but sufficient conditions for a contribution to the effect.
• Each disjunct/summand is sufficient but not necessary for the effect or for a contribution to the effect. This is neatly summarized in the slogan "There's more than one way to skin a cat."
• Within a cluster represented as a disjunct/summand, no factor by itself can produce an effect. All the elements are required to get a contribution to the effect. This reflects the idea that the salient cause-say, a proposed treatment-needs "help" to produce its contribution. These helping factors are called "moderator," "support," or "interactive" factors and get charted in familiar epidemiologists' pies.
| THE TROUBLE WITH RCTS
The trouble with RCTs is that they do not tell us much. Randomized controlled trials investigate only one aspect of the POE: β i ; then, only a population average of it: Exp β i ; and for that, they give only an estimate of it; this estimate has the virtue of being unbiased, which may not be so useful, and may lack precision, which normally is useful, and the estimate is for one specific population-the population enrolled in the trial. This last is not peculiar to RCTs of course: study results are always about the things that are studied, not about something else. Going beyond the study population requires other knowledge, generally much other knowledge. 
That is pretty amazing: we can estimate the average across a set of numbers without knowing even one of the numbers. Derivatively from this result, we can draw explicit causal conclusions: if the ATE is positive, it follows that the treatment must cause the outcome in at least some individuals in the study population. What fixes the value of the ATE? From its position in the POE, we see that β i moderates the contribution T makes to Y, hence is a function of the net effect of the support factors for T to produce Y in i. So the ATE depends on the distribution of support factors in a population.
There are 2 main drawbacks to RCTs for predicting what will work. First, orthogonality is hard to achieve. Randomization is supposed to achieve this at base but much can go wrong after and most experiments are neither blinded at all points where it could matter nor well policed for correlations that arise post-randomization from other difference the 2 groups experience, like time, place, and length of treatment, clinician skill, etc.
Second are issues of bias versus precision. That the difference in average between treatment and control groups is an unbiased estimate of the ATE: ie, they match in expectation over indefinitely many repeated randomizations on the study population. But generally we do only a single run on the study population. † What we would probably prefer is precision-getting close to the answer. We would get exactly the right answer if the net effect of all causal factors other than the treatment were exactly balanced between the 2 wings of the experi- What capacity a treatment has to contribute to an effect for an individual depends on the underlying structures-physiological, material, psychological, cultural, and economic-that makes some causal pathways possible for that individual and some not, some likely and some unlikely. This is a well-recognized problem when it comes to making inferences from model organisms to people. But it is equally a problem in making inferences from one person to another or from one population to another. Yet in these latter cases it is too often downplayed.
When the problem is explicitly noted, it is often addressed by treating the underlying structures as moderators in the potential out- 
| TAKING A DIRECT APPROACH
Rather than a roundabout approach, trying to learn about one population by studying another, we could try studying the target population itself. The usual wisdom is that the best thing to do is to conduct an There is no way to draw a firm distinction between clinchers and vouchers. It all depends on how we articulate the methods. Consulting a fortune teller can be a clincher-so long as the method instructs us to consult a fortune teller who gets right answers. Still it is a useful distinction since good methodology dictates articulating methods in such a way that we know how to apply them, which means that we should have a good idea what it takes to warrant the method's assumptions.
| Clinchers
Instrumental variables provide an unbiased estimate of the ATE in a population using observational data from the population by identifying "instruments" that affect the treatment variable but have no effect on the outcome other than via the treatment:
Instrumental variable s ð Þ→Treatment variable s ð Þ →Outcome measure Distance from hospital→Use of treatment A or B →Recovery from surgery
The instrument is like an experimental intervention that changes the cause under test and no other causes of the outcome, so that any changes in the outcome can be attributed to the putative cause.
These have been advocated for use in medicine and public health by, among other, Newhouse and McClellan. 5 Reiss 6 provides an excellent discussion of the method and of the conditions that must be met for its conclusion to be secured.
Causal structural models are a set of POEs, one for each of a set of time-ordered variables, which will have a triangular (or block triangular) form:
Standard econometric techniques can, in happy circumstances, estimate the coefficients in these equations from observational data on a population. In that case, the equations should be functionally correct for the population. That does not make them causal-real POEs where only causes of the dependent variable appear on the right-hand side. They could just represent associations, "correlations." There are, though, special conditions in which, provably, a functionally correct structural model is causally correct. These conditions are related to those that must be met for the equations to contain an instrumental variable. It may be rare for these conditions to be satisfied, but when they are, we can get a great deal of causal information about a population from observational data. For more on this, see Cartwright. ;
for an illustration of how to use them to reduce bias due to confounding in a medical context, see Shrier and Platt
10
; for reservations about their usefulness in those medical contexts where causation is more effectively represented with differential equations than with
POEs, see Aalen et al.
‡
Deduction from theory is widely used to draw causal conclusions throughout engineering and the natural sciences. Clearly, the warrant for the conclusion depends on the warrant for the premises, but for the premises as they need to be formulated to bear on the case at hand. A generally well-warranted theory that has not been much tested in similar cases might provide less warrant than one that is been very successful in predictions of similar conclusions in similar settings even if the theory does not have such a good track record elsewhere. I am often told that this approach is not useful for Guideline construction because we have so few trustworthy theories to guide us in medicine and public health. This is a relative matter.
How trustworthy are the premises required for the theory deduction of the conclusion in view as compared with the premises required for this or that other method to deliver that same conclusion? I would suppose that it is not often that the premises needed for any methods are highly trustworthy. If so, there is no way to avoid having
to figure out what lessons to draw from a mix of evidence all of which is dicey.
| Vouchers
Case studies are commonly used in legal cases, ethnographies, policy evaluation, and post-hoc fault diagnoses. They use a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods and can often credibly establish causeeffect relations for individuals but are seldom useful for estimating
ATEs in a population since generally the right kinds of information will not be available for every individual to allow a credible judgement one way or the other about causation.
These may be of special help in studying rare diseases, where statistics are not available. But their usefulness is not confined to rare diseases since they document trajectories, which can be very useful for clinical care in many other diseases. One of the major movements in health care recently is the use of patient records to document variations in trajectories and outcomes using data mining of massive patient record data bases, particularly in the United States given the way insurance documents all episodes, tests, interventions etc., but also in the European Union's drive to fund research into future and emerging technologies-health informatics. Diabetes, where we are concerned about management by patient and clinician through a life ‡ I am not sure how widespread this problem is. I have not, for instance, seen a defence of the RCT as a method for causal inference in cases where causality is represented in a dynamic equations framework.
course, is a key illustration. For one among many examples of a diabetes case study, see Preuveneers and Berbers. 12 For a good general account of case study methods, see Byrne and Ragin. It looks much like a causal structural model, except with a SCEM we do not look to statistics for help to fill values into the schema but investigate the actual case itself, as in a case study or in process tracing. As with casual Bayes nets, the idea is that by investigating a larger structure, we can sometimes get better evidence about the target Especially given that the easiest assumption to feel secure about for RCTs-that the assignment is done "randomly"-is far from enough to support orthogonality, which is itself only one among the assumptions that need support. I sometimes hear, "Only the RCT can control for unknown unknowns." But nothing can control for unknowns that we know nothing about. There is no reason to suppose that, for a
given conclusion, the causal knowledge that it takes to stop post-randomization correlations in an RCT is always, or generally, more available or more reliable than the knowledge required for one or another of the other methods to be reliable.
It is also essential to be clear what the conclusion is. As with any study method, RCTS can only draw conclusions about the objects studied-for the RCT, the population enrolled in the trial, which is seldom the one we are interested in. The RCT method can be expanded of course to include among its assumptions that the trial population is a representative sample of the target. Then it follows deductively that the difference in mean outcomes between treatment and control groups is an unbiased estimate of the ATE of the target population. 
